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Summary: This paper examines less discussed aspects of Euroscepti-
cism in Eastern Europe as a component of the institutional history of 
the 2004 EU enlargement. A focus on public support for European in-
tegration allows us to evaluate the consequences of the EU’s enlarge-
ment policy from the perspective of democratic legitimacy, as public 
attitudes demonstrate how institutions live up to the expectations of 
the citizens in a democratic setting. It also allows us to relate the leg-
islative history of the eastward enlargement to its social impact and 
domestic political implications. 
The paper posits Euroscepticism as an unexpected outcome of the 
legal-institutional implementation of the EU enlargement policy. It ar-
gues that while East-European Euroscepticism defies clear categori-
sation as it fails to demonstrate consistent longitudinal trends  not 
consistent across its performance evaluation, identity, and democratic 
legitimacy dimensions, it is indicative of the disconnect between the 
adjustment dynamics of the EU accession of Eastern Europe, accom-
plished at the elite level, and the broad-based public response to it. 
The core of East-European Euroscepticism is declining public trust in 
the European Union, its policies, institutions, and the economic ben-
efits it generates against the background of general dissatisfaction 
with the workings of national and European democracy. The East-
European publics have become increasingly sceptical of their repre-
sentation as citizens whose voice ‘counts’ in the EU. They perceive the 
EU as less relevant to their personal situation although it represents 
well the interests of the Member States. Such contradictory evidence 
suggests that the conventional measures of Euroscepticism as a pan-
European phenomenon need to be re-examined by exploring trends 
of continuity and change in public support for the EU in Central and 
Eastern Europe in the context of the 2004 enlargement. 
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We are determined to build a peaceful Europe in which all the 
peoples of this continent can live and work together as a true 
family. […] And that means successfully enlarging the European 
Union – exactly as we have been mandated to do. […] We are writ-
ing an extraordinary passage in the history of this continent, and 
our citizens need to understand its full significance. People need 
to know why this enlargement is to be welcomed, not feared. 
Romano Prodi1
This enlargement reunited Europe after many years of artificial 
division. It was also a way to anchor democracy, freedom and 
the rule of law for many millions of people who were living before 
behind the Iron Curtain. […] The reality is that ten years on, Eu-
rope is stronger, richer and safer – politically, economically and 
culturally. 
José Manuel Barroso2 
1 Introduction
There is a remarkable congruence between the 2002 policy pro-
nouncement of the then President of the European Commission Romano 
Prodi that announced the EU’s decision to approve the accession of eight 
Central and East-European Countries (CEECs)3 and former President 
Barroso’s speech on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the 2004 
EU enlargement. The East-European enlargement came closest to trans-
forming the EU’s continued territorial expansion from a process of asym-
metrical membership negotiations into a policy: a process of purposive 
political action equipped with rules, policy tools, decision-making proce-
dures, resources, and a mechanism of implementation. The foundations 
of the policy were laid down by the decisions of the Copenhagen Euro-
pean Council of December 1993 which established the political and eco-
nomic criteria for EU membership: democracy, the rule of law, respect for 
human rights and the rights of minorities, market economy and ability to 
1 Romano Prodi, ‘Catching the Tide of History: Enlargement and the Future of the Union’ 
(speech 00-374/2000, Brussels, 11 October 2000) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
SPEECH-00-374_en.htm> accessed 30 December 2016.
2 European Commission, ‘Statement by President Barroso on the 10th anniversary of the 
reunification of Europe’ (30 April 2014)  <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATE-
MENT-14-142_en.htm> accessed 30 December 2016. 
3 The paper will use the term ‘Central and East-European countries’, or CEECs, with re-
gard to the eight East-European countries of the 2004 accession, namely the Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The 10-year period 
since the 2004 East-European enlargement provides a natural time frame to examine early 
medium- to long-term trends and serve as a foundation for the subsequent examination of 
public opinion trends in Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia. 
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withstand competitive pressure, and institutional capacity to implement 
EU legislation (the Community acquis) prior to membership.4 
The new policy of enlargement focused on the obligations of potential 
Member States, stressing that membership was conditional on compli-
ance with EU rules and values. The eastward enlargement established a 
process of interaction among the Member States, the EU institutional ac-
tors, and the candidate countries whereby the latter committed to adopt-
ing the community acquis and to political and economic adjustment to the 
criteria for EU membership. The approach was fundamentally top-down, 
based on compliance and rule adoption.5 It led to the implementation of 
a model of EU membership for Eastern Europe based on strengthened 
democratic institutions, and especially the national executive, freedom 
of movement of people, goods, capital, and services in the EU, and the 
pooling of national policymaking into a process of multilevel governance.6 
The East-European enlargement effectively extended the EU’s legal 
order to the new Member States from Central and Eastern Europe. As a 
process of institutional expansion, it was designed to strengthen the le-
gitimacy and effectiveness of European integration through treaty devel-
opment, growing application of the principle of qualified-majority voting 
in decision-making, and bringing the EU closer to the European citizens. 
The policy by far exceeded the objectives of a merit-based territorial 
expansion. In the context of the 2004 accession, in the 2007 enlarge-
ment to Bulgaria and Romania, and in 2013, when Croatia became the 
EU’s 28th Member State, the EU emerged as an external anchor for the 
democratic transformation of Eastern Europe. Its intended systemic con-
sequences were positive security externalities, democratic consolidation 
(originally established as a goal of the EU South-European enlargement 
of the 1980s), and economic growth. 
However, for a policy to perform and yield the desired results, it needs 
to be accepted. In order to prepare the publics in the EU Member States 
4 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions Copenhagen European Council (21-22 
June) Bulletin EC 6 (European Council, 1993). The 1993 policy statement of the Copen-
hagen European Council was preceded by the Europe Agreements, signed with individual 
CEECs in the period 1991–1996 as a form of institutional cooperation, which included ar-
eas as diverse as political dialogue, market competition, and the movement of persons, and 
were designed to prepare a future enlargement of the Union. 
5  The mechanism of conditionality in the East-European enlargement is discussed in 
detail in Heather Grabbe, The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization through Condi-
tionality in Central and Eastern Europe (Palgrave 2006); Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich 
Sedelmeier (eds), The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (Cornell University 
Press 2005), among others.    
6 See Lisbeth Hooghe and Gary Marks, ‘A Post-Functionalist Theory of Integration: From 
Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus” (2009) 39(3) British Journal of Political 
Science 1. 
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in the West to endorse the eastward enlargement, the EU institutional 
actors implemented a discursive strategy.7 Enlargement was framed as 
a process designed to permanently abolish divisions across Europe, im-
prove living standards in the EU, enhance its geopolitical position, and 
promote a liberal political and economic order in Eastern Europe based 
on the rule of law, democratic government, respect for human rights, and 
a market economy. Such concepts were embedded in all keystone docu-
ments which had shaped the EU’s enlargement policy from the formula-
tion of membership criteria by the Copenhagen European Council to the 
EU accession treaties.8 ‘The European Union is set to achieve its most 
ambitious enlargement ever… We are putting behind us the old divisions 
in Europe, consolidating peace, democracy and prosperity throughout 
the continent’, a 2003 EU poster read.9 Obviously, ideational considera-
tions were at the forefront of political discourse.  The then President of 
the European Parliament, Nicole Fontaine, remarked: 
Enlargement is, for all of us, a major opportunity in political and 
economic terms. But enlargement is, above all, a historic moral 
obligation – the obligation to bring about the reunification of the 
great European family.10
The framing approach was instrumental, as it communicated the in-
dividual dimensions of the eastward enlargement to different segments of 
the European publics.11 While nominally the principal frames of the 2004 
eastward enlargement were embedded in a common discursive frame-
work, the predominantly institutional and technical nature of the acces-
sion as a type of policy transfer did not develop an adequate communica-
tion strategy capable of generating public support for EU membership in 
the candidate countries. Positive public attitudes in Eastern Europe were 
taken for granted in view of the benefits of EU membership and demo-
cratic reform. The citizens’ perspective of the EU accession of the CEECs 
reflected in public attitudes towards the EU institutions, policies, and 
systemic relevance were less discussed and remained poorly understood. 
The East-European enlargement was conceptualised as the success-
ful completion of the post-communist transition in Central and East-
7 Thomas Risse, A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres 
(Cornell University Press 2010) 207.
8 See the 2003 Accession Treaty of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hun-
gary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Document JOL_2003_236_R_0017_01 [2003] OJ 
L236/17.
9 Published by the European Commission, 3 December 2003 <http://bookshop.europa.
eu/en/bundles/posters-cbcWuep2Ixvv8AAAEuyyUD0Ufc/> accessed 30 December 2016.
10 Nicole Fontaine, Speech to the European Parliament, 26 June 2001. On file with author.
11 Juan Diez Medrano, Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom (Princeton University Press 2003).
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ern Europe, although without a corresponding narrative to validate and 
sustain the legitimisation of membership outside the established model 
of the EU’s output legitimacy.12 No parallel process of political sociali-
sation, persuasive communication, or cognitive mobilisation was imple-
mented by the mainstream domestic and EU-based political elites. The 
main enlargement debate focused on ensuring the alignment of public 
policy in Eastern Europe to EU governance templates by means of en-
hanced conditionality criteria and adjustment mechanisms, collectively 
conceptualised as the Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe.13 
This discourse brought in a new alignment of groups indifferent or hostile 
to further enlargement. As a result, the macro-process of the East-Eu-
ropean accession remained relatively disconnected from the micro-level 
of individual values, preferences, ideologies, partisanship, and cognitive 
mobilisation. The mass publics in the New Member States (NMS) did not 
benefit from a coherent process of socialisation, in contrast to the prior 
experience of the citizens in the Old Member States in Western Europe.14 
The approach to conceptualising the eastward enlargement as an expan-
sion of the EU-based democratic political order and the Western commu-
nity of liberal values, while effective for the Old Member States, produced 
unexpected consequences for the acceding countries.15 
East-European Euroscepticism emerged in the context of the post-
Cold War euphoria of the reunification of Europe. The East-European 
enlargement was dominated by the mega-discourse of ‘returning to Eu-
rope’, widely shared in scholarly, policy, and political circles.16 However, 
the post-accession period demonstrated the lack of congruence between 
the EU enlargement policy, jointly implemented by the transnational Eu-
ropean elites, and East-European public opinion.17 The unanticipated 
outcome of the 2004 East-European accession, described in the litera-
12 Output legitimacy is the classical form of democratic legitimacy in the EU not based on 
direct identification with the EU and the type of EU-centred democracy but based on the 
benefits of membership and opportunities created for the EU citizens. See Fritz Scharpf, 
Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (OUP 1999).
13 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (n 5). 
14 On the presence of socialization and cognitive mobilization effects in public opinion 
in Western Europe, see Ronald Inglehart, ‘Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity’ 
(1970) 3 Comparative Politics 45-70; Simona Guerra and Fabio Serricchio, ‘Identity and 
Economic Rationality: Explaining Attitudes towards the EU in a Time of Crisis’ in Boyka 
Stefanova (ed), The European Union beyond the Crisis: Evolving Governance, Contested Poli-
cies, and Disenchanted Publics (Lexington Books 2014). 
15 Risse (n 7) 208.
16 Simona Guerra, Central and Eastern European Attitudes in the Face of Union (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2013) 2.
17 Milada Vachudova and Liesbet Hooghe ‘Postcommunist Politics in a Magnetic Field: How 
Transition and EU Accession Structure Party Competition on European Integration?’ (2009) 
7(2) Comparative European Politics 179.  
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ture as the ‘paradox’ of the EU’s eastward enlargement,18 emerged as 
a growing public realisation that the EU enlargement had resulted in 
asymmetrical membership for the East-European Member States.19 The 
East-European enlargement produced relatively concentrated, measur-
able costs, predominantly distributed among the Member States in West-
ern Europe and diverse benefits, both economic and political, for the 
NMS in the east.  The costs included budgetary contributions, increased 
labour market competition in the context of labour mobility, and move-
ment of FDI towards Eastern Europe. The East-European enlargement 
transferred resources from large diffuse groups (voters, taxpayers, con-
sumers) to narrow ones (investors in industry). Such developments led to 
the repositioning of groups defined as winners and losers from the East-
European enlargement, especially in the CEECs, whose citizens lacked 
the socialising experience of the distributive effects of EU policies.
Public ambiguity in assessing the benefits associated with EU mem-
bership deepened in parallel with the European economic and financial 
crises. The literature identifies the Euro-crises as a source of declining 
public trust in the EU across the East-West divide, although the determi-
nants of public dissatisfaction with the policies and direction of the Eu-
ropean project continued to differ between the two parts of Europe. The 
work of Borbála Göncz, Simona Guerra and Fabio Serricchio, John Garry 
and James Tilley, and Klaus Armingeon and Besir Ceka, among others, 
has explored the loss of institutional trust in the EU in the context of the 
crisis, while noting its differential effect on both the process of attitude 
formation and public responses to the EU.20 
Furthermore, beyond the crisis, the global context of EU member-
ship has been changing. The relative utility of enlargement as a systemic 
process and a most important policy tool for the democratisation of East-
ern Europe has been changing as well. Originally, enlargement took place 
as ‘the neighbours of its neighbours’ were socialised by becoming EU 
Member States. However, the enlargement and neighbourhood policies of 
18 See Alex Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, ‘Introduction: Opposing Europe? The Politics of 
Euroscepticism in Europe’ in Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart (eds), Opposing Europe? 
The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism (OUP 2008).
19 Carl Rowlands, ‘Europe’s Periphery: The Economies of Central and Eastern Europe Have 
Become Peripheral Dependencies of the Core EU States’ (2010) 46 Soundings 112.
20 Borbála Göncz, ‘People’s Perceptions of the European Union and the Effects of the Crisis: 
A Persistent East-West Divide?’ in Boyka Stefanova (n 14); Guerra and Serricchio (n 14); 
John Garry and James Tilley, ‘Attitudes to European Integration: Investigating East–West 
Heterogeneity’ (2009) 31(5) Journal of European Integration 537; Marcel Lubbers and Peer 
Scheepers, ‘Divergent Trends of Euroscepticism in Countries and Regions of the European 
Union’ (2010) 49(6)  European Journal of Political Research 787; Klaus Armingeon and Be-
sir Ceka, ‘The Loss of Trust in the European Union during the Great Recession since 2007: 
The Role of Heuristics from the National Political System,’ (2014) 15(1) European Union 
Politics 82.    
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the EU have stalled along their components, the Western Balkans, Tur-
key, and the post-Soviet space.21 
Global competitiveness pressures have pushed the EU towards re-
forming the scope of the internal market by extending common regula-
tory frameworks towards the Transatlantic marketplace, Japan, China, 
and Latin America. Internally, the image of a united Europe has been af-
fected by disintegration dynamics and labour market disruptions. Thus, 
the principles of enlargement could not be validated in the era of political 
and social change in the EU, as a result of which the EU citizens critically 
reflect on the modalities and direction of the EU project. The socialisation 
of East-European citizens has therefore taken place in a pronounced and 
deepening public ‘constraining dissensus’ on elite-sponsored integration 
initiatives.22 
Given the diversity of increasingly critical attitudes and lack of con-
sistent trends over the historically limited period of 12 years since the 
East-European enlargement (2004-2016), how may East-European Eu-
roscepticism be defined, and how may its principal dimensions be estab-
lished? 
1.1 The argument in brief
The purpose of this paper is to examine the less discussed aspects of 
Euroscepticism in Eastern Europe as a response to the legislative history 
of enlargement, with a focus on its contradictory logic. Understanding 
East-European public opinion allows us to evaluate the consequences 
of the EU’s enlargement policy from the perspective of its overarching 
significance as a template of political development whose core should 
naturally be constituted by democratic legitimacy and trust, as public 
attitudes and perceptions demonstrate how institutions live up to the 
expectations of the citizens in a democratic setting. It also allows us to 
relate the legislative history of the East-European accession to its socio-
political implications. 
This analysis posits East-European Euroscepticism as an unexpect-
ed outcome of the legal-institutional implementation of the EU enlarge-
ment policy reflected in several adverse long-term trends: declining levels 
of public support for and appreciation of the benefits associated with the 
EU membership of the CEECs, declining levels of trust in the EU, its in-
21 Reference is made to the pluralisation of the format of the Eastern Partnership under the 
European Neighbourhood Policy whereby Azerbaijan and Armenia opted out of closer rela-
tions with the EU, while a 2016 referendum on the ratification of the EU-Ukraine Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement in the Netherlands failed to obtain public support for 
the Agreement.  
22 On the evolution of the ‘constraining dissensus’ in the post-Maastricht era, see Hooghe 
and Marks (n 6).
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stitutions, and democracy model, high volatility of public reactions to the 
European integration project, as well as a lack of stable positive identifi-
cation with the EU and legitimacy. 
The literature exploring Euroscepticism in an East-European context 
has focused on establishing the sources of public views on the EU by means 
of individual-level data testing theories of utilitarian or cultural and identi-
ty-based explanations, as well as comparative studies on country-level and 
regional differences in an East-West context.23 Most of these approaches 
are based on explaining voting trends and the sources of individual-level 
attitudes informed by utilitarian or affective predispositions. Issues of le-
gitimacy, trust, and loyalty have been discussed either through their ad-
ditive or comparative effect, and have not focused on the cross-cutting, 
multi-dimensional nature of such political attitudes. Building upon the ar-
gument that East-European Euroscepticism is an unanticipated outcome 
of the eastward enlargement, the paper traces its evolution with a special 
emphasis on public attitudes towards the EU as a form of legitimising re-
flection on the quality of European governance and democracy. 
The paper argues that East-European Euroscepticism is anchored in 
diverging personal and sociotropic assessments of the utility of EU mem-
bership for the European publics. While the citizens of the CEECs ap-
preciate the benefits of membership for their countries, they are increas-
ingly sceptical of their personal representation as EU citizens whose voice 
‘counts’ in a united Europe. Against the background of volatile levels of 
satisfaction with national democracy, subject to wide cross-national vari-
ation, the East-European publics are also less likely to trust the Euro-
pean institutions. In order to establish the dynamics of East-European 
Euroscepticism, the paper maps out its principal dimensions by examin-
ing country-level data derived from the Standard Eurobarometer surveys 
of public opinion in the EU with a special focus on variables measuring 
trust and legitimacy. The approach to data collection is selective, exploring 
critical data points for the EU membership of the CEECs: the outset of the 
2004 East-European accession; the midpoint of 2009, contextually defined 
by the height of the European economic and financial crisis and the 2009 
Elections for Members of the European Parliament; and the period follow-
ing the 10th anniversary of the eastward enlargement (2014-2016).24 The 
paper draws conclusions as to the long-term trajectories of Euroscepticism 
reflected in measures of public trust and electoral behaviour. 
23 Lauren McLaren, ‘Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Per-
ceived Cultural Threat?’ (2002) 64(2) The Journal of Politics 551; Lauren McLaren, ‘Explain-
ing Mass Level Euroscepticism: Identity, Interests, and Institutional Distrust’ (2007) 42(2) 
Acta Politica 233.
24 Data for 2004 is examined for eight CEECs: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lat-
via, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Bulgaria and Romania are included in the 
2009 cohort. Croatia is added to the 2014–2016 data.  
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2 The varieties of Euroscepticism
The question about loyalty, albeit limited to the level of transnational 
elites as politically relevant actors, was central to neofunctionalism, the 
classical theory of European integration.25 According to Ernst Haas, Eu-
ropean integration is measured by the extent to which it matches the 
economic expectations of political actors, as well as their fears, interests, 
satisfaction with the national political context, ideologies, or political effi-
cacy.26 Neofunctionalism did not address the political relevance of public 
preferences and loyalties at the unit level. As an elite-led process, Euro-
pean integration originally operated in the context of a ‘permissive con-
sensus’, defined as passive public approval of the integration process and 
an assumption that the transfer of public loyalties to the EU would be 
unproblematic, as a result of the efficiency and welfare gains associated 
with European integration.27 However, more recent theorising has deter-
mined that it is both normatively and empirically significant to examine 
the potential convergence of the interests and loyalties of European citi-
zens.28 Viewed from a legal-institutionalist perspective, the measures of 
public support for European integration should not only reflect the sim-
ple dichotomy or additive effects of interests and identities but also per-
ceptions of belonging to a democratically organised political community 
whose institutions are representative of the aspirations and wellbeing of 
EU citizens. Such measures, however, may not be as straightforward in 
Eastern Europe as they have been in the West. 
Euroscepticism, or the departure from unconditional public support 
for European integration, has many faces: it pertains to party politics and 
public opinion; it may be issue-based or general. There is an agreement 
in the literature that attitudes towards the EU cannot be unidimensional 
or binary. Paul Taggart suggests that Euroscepticism is best studied as 
an encompassing term that ‘expresses the idea of contingent, or qualified 
opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition 
to the process of European integration’.29 In an elaboration to the original 
definition, Paul Taggart and Alex Szczerbiak include categories of ‘soft’ 
25 Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957 
(Stanford University Press 1968).
26 ibid 15.
27 Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold, Europe’s Would-be Polity: Patterns of Change in 
the European Community (Prentice Hall 1970).
28 Hooghe and Marks (n 6); Lauren McLaren, Identity, Interests, and Attitudes to European 
Integration (Palgrave Macmillan 2006); Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca, ‘The Political Basis of Sup-
port for European Integration’ (2000) 1(2) European Union Politics 147, among others.
29 Paul Taggart, ‘A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western Eu-
ropean Party Systems’ (1998) 33 European Journal of Political Research 363, 366. See also 
Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde, ‘The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on Euro-
pean Integration in East Central Europe’ (2002) 3(3) European Union Politics 297.
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and ‘hard’ Euroscepticism. ‘Hard’ Euroscepticism is an ‘outright rejection 
of the entire project of European political and economic integration, and 
opposition to joining or remaining within the EU’. ‘Soft’ Euroscepticism is 
an evolving ‘contingent or qualified opposition to European integration’, 
the current or planned trajectory or transfer of competences.30 
The distinction between ‘soft’ versus ‘hard’ Euroscepticism is inter-
twined with differences between diffuse and specific support for Euro-
pean integration.31 Diffuse support is support for the general ideas of 
European integration that underlie the EU. Specific support is support 
for the practice of integration; that is, the EU as it is and as it is de-
veloping. From this more contextualised perspective, the authors iden-
tify two dimensions of diffuse and specific support. The first dimension, 
‘support for the ideas of European integration’, separates the Europhiles 
from the Europhobes. Europhiles believe in the key ideas of European 
integration underlying the EU: institutionalised cooperation on the ba-
sis of pooled sovereignty (the political element) and an integrated liberal 
market economy (the economic element). The second dimension, ‘support 
for EU policies’, separates the Euroenthusiasts from the Eurosceptics.32 
Strictly defined, Euroscepticism in Eastern Europe largely conforms to 
the lack of specific support for EU policies and direction. It also includes 
the category of the Euroneutrals: citizens who consent to the idea of EU 
membership but are not enthusiastic about it.33 
2.1 The puzzle of Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe
The emergence and, with time, persistence of sceptical and oppos-
ing views of the EU in Eastern Europe is counter-intuitive. It represents 
a puzzle for most theoretical accounts of the European integration of 
the CEECs. There is no consensus in the literature on the drivers of 
East-European Euroscepticism: utilitarian or affective dispositions, dis-
satisfaction with or trust in the national political system and government 
institutions, cognitive mobilisation or partisanship. For example, Muñoz, 
Torcal, and Bonet find that the respective level of trust in the national 
institutions both hinders and fosters Euroscepticism, as both a model 
of compensation (that is, higher levels of trust in the EU relative to the 
institutions of national government) and congruence (positive association 
between low levels of domestic trust and trust in the EU) have remained 
30 Paul Taggart and Alex Szczerbiak, ‘Parties, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the 
Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of 
the Political Studies Association, Manchester 10–12 April 2001) 6. 
31 Kopecky and Mudde (n 29) 300.
32 Iván Llamazares and Wladimir Gramacho, ‘Eurosceptics among Euroenthusiasts: An 
Analysis of Southern European Public Opinions’ (2007) 42(2–3) Acta Politica 211.
33 Alex Szczerbiak, ‘Polish Public Opinion: Explaining Declining Support for EU Member-
ship’ (2001) 39(1) Journal of Common Market Studies 108.
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valid, significantly affected by the national context.34 Similarly, studies 
have found that East-European Euroscepticism is less likely to be the 
product of cognitive mobilisation and more likely to be affected by politi-
cal agency and ideological leanings, therefore bridging across individual-
level factors, such as cost-benefit analysis and affective dispositions, with 
contextual factors and political mobilisation.35  
Most studies measure political efficacy by knowledge of the EU insti-
tutions and interest in politics and do not typically link cognitive meas-
ures to affective dispositions, especially trust and legitimacy. The litera-
ture on the institutional foundations of trust, however, has argued that 
the measures of trust need to be complemented with indirect but effec-
tive measures that reflect all components of public attitudes, utilitarian 
(performance), affective (diffuse support), and identity-based.36 In their 
encounter of institutional rules, actors do not automatically change be-
haviour or values. Actors have certain expectations about positive payoffs 
and perceptions about what is normatively acceptable. 
It was a successful project of market liberalisation and economic 
growth in Eastern Europe. In the ten years since the 2004 accession, the 
CEECs’ economies grew in real terms by 3.0% a year versus an average of 
1.0% annual real GDP growth for the EU Member States in the west (EU 
15).37 The benefits of enlargement were positively viewed across Europe. 
Graph 1 shows that, at the time of the 2004 enlargement, broad majori-
ties in both the Western and the East-European EU Member States per-
ceived enlargement as a positive process along the principal dimensions 
of transformative change that it brought to the organisation of public life 
in Europe: free movement and travel, modernisation of the CEECs, in-
34 See Jordi Muñoz, Mariano Torcal, and Eduard Bonet, ‘Institutional Trust and Multilevel 
Government in the European Union: Congruence or Compensation?’ (2011) 12(4) Euro-
pean Union Politics 551 on the dual relationship of compensation and congruence. On the 
relationship between trust in the domestic political institutions and the EU, see Gabriella 
Ilonszki, ‘National Discontent and EU Support in Central and Eastern Europe’ (2009) 61 
Europe-Asia Studies 1041.
35 On the cost-mobilisation model, see Robert Rohrschneider and Stephen Whitefield Ste-
phen, ‘Political Parties, Public Opinion and European Integration in Post-Communist Coun-
tries: The State of the Art’ (2006) 7(1) European Union Politics 141.
36 Bo Rothstein, ‘Trust, Social Dilemmas, and Collective Memories’ (2000) 12(4) Journal of 
Theoretical Politics 477. See also Bo Rothstein, Just Institutions Matter: The Moral and Politi-
cal Logic of the Universal Welfare State (CUP 1998).
37 United Nations. World Economic Situation and Prospects and Update (United Nations 
publication, Sales No E.14.II.C.2) 2014 Annex Tables, 153
  <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_archive/2014wesp_an-
nex_tables.pdf> accessed  30 December 2016. The new EU Member States from Eastern 
Europe registered the highest annual GDP growth rate of 6.0% in 2006 versus 3.4% for 
the EU 15. Eastern Europe registered positive real GDP growth rates through the 10-year 
period since the 2004 accession with the exception of 2009, when the EU economy declined 
by 4.5% in real terms (-3.8% for the CEECs).
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creased prosperity and competitiveness, enhanced security and stability 
in Europe, and decreased levels of organised crime and illegal immigra-
tion. 
Graph 1. The EU 2004 Enlargement in Retrospect (2009): The Con-
sequences of the Integration of CEECs into the European Union, net pos-
itive responses (agreement with statement) 
Data source: European Commission (2004) ‘Flash Eurobarometer No 257: 
Views on European Union Enlargement 21 <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opin-
ion/flash/fl_257_en.pdf> 
Economic growth, however, was not linked to positive economic ex-
pectations. At the time of the East-European enlargement, public sup-
port for EU membership was on the decline along its policy, identity, and 
utilitarian dimensions, and public preferences were becoming increas-
ingly volatile.
The Eastern Europeans joined the EU as more pessimistic with re-
gard to their personal situation. At the time of the 2004 EU accession 
of the CEECs, 22% of respondents in Eastern Europe expected life to 
improve versus 32% in Western Europe. Only 15% (versus 33% in West-
ern Europe) expected a better financial situation, although sociotropic 
assessments about the improvement of the national economy in both 
categories of countries were relatively similar (15%). 
The net difference between positive and negative evaluations of sub-
jective wellbeing in Eastern Europe was narrowing. The net positive dif-
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ference varied between 9 and 17 percentage points in Slovenia, Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania with net negative differences in Hungary (-2%), the 
Czech Republic and Poland (-6%) and Slovakia (-12%).38 Public percep-
tions of the rising adjustment costs on the road to EU membership were 
reflected in growing negative opinions on the personal situation for the 
preceding five years, ranging between 41 and 44%. On the eve of the 
2004 East-European enlargement, public attitudes in the CEECs were 
divided, although citizens supported the systemic context and benefits of 
EU membership.39 
Utilitarian attitudes alone are an oversimplified measure of Euro-
scepticism. They do not fully account for the mutually contradictory di-
mensions of public support for the EU in the CEECs. Similarly, the emer-
gent East-European Euroscepticism may not be adequately explained by 
models applicable to public support for European integration in Western 
Europe.40 East-European Euroscepticism defies strict categorisation as a 
utilitarian, affective, or cognitive response. It lacks the dynamics of con-
tinuity and change typical of Euroscepticism in Western Europe, centred 
on concerns about the loss of sovereignty as a result of EU membership 
and the poor standards of democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions 
when compared to the democratic exercise of power at the national lev-
el.41
3 East-European Euroscepticism: A special variety? 
According to Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde, the measures of spe-
cific and diffuse support for the EU should be derived from the perspec-
tive of what Europe means to the citizens of the CEECs: a reflection of 
38 European Commission, Eurobarometer Spring 2004: Public Opinion in the European Un-
ion (Eurobarometer, Joint Full Report of Eurobarometer 61 and CC Eurobarometer 2004.1, 
July 2004) <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb61/eb61_en.pdf> ac-
cessed 30 December 2016.
39 Guerra (n 16); Jorg Jacobs and Detlef Pollack, ‘Support Based on Values? Attitudes 
toward the EU in Eleven Postcommunist Societies’ in Robert Rohrschneider and Stephen 
Whitefield (eds), Public Opinion, Party Competition, and the European Union in Post-Commu-
nist Europe (Palgrave Macmillan 2006) 86.
40 Aleks Szczerbiak, ‘Polish Public Opinion: Explaining Declining Support for EU Member-
ship’ (2001) 39(1) Journal of Common Market Studies 105; Paul Taggart and Aleks Szc-
zerbiak, ‘The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States’ (2002) 
Opposing Europe, Sussex European Institute Working Paper 51. 
41 See Marianne Sundlisæter Skinner, ‘Different Varieties of Euroscepticism? Conceptu-
alizing and Explaining Euroscepticism in Western European Non-member States (2013) 
51(1) Journal of Common Market Studies 122; Simona Guerra, ‘Does Familiarity Bring 
Contempt? Determinants of Public Support for European Integration and Opposition to It 
before and after Accession’ (2013) 51(1) Journal of Common Market Studies 38; Sofia Vasi-
lopoulou, ‘Continuity and Change in the Study of Euroscepticism: Plus Ça Change?’ (2013) 
51(1) Journal of Common Market Studies 153.
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their interests, identities, aspirations, and community sentiment.42 The 
appropriate measure of Euroscepticism needs to contextualise the con-
ventional indicators of output legitimacy, conventionally applied with 
regard to the EU’s democratic credentials,43 by including the overlap-
ping aspects of dissatisfaction with government performance, as well as 
with the workings of democracy at the national and the EU level. Such 
broad-based indicators of legitimacy serve as a benchmark against which 
East-European Euroscepticism is measured. The emphasis on trust, le-
gitimacy, and relevance to the political aspirations of European citizens 
is especially pronounced in the East-European variety of Euroscepticism. 
The question of legitimacy, defined in terms of acceptance of authority as 
morally the right thing is at the origin of the logic of appropriateness as 
a replacement of rational choice action. As Rothstein has argued, actors 
develop ‘cognitive maps’ about the trustworthiness of institutions.44 The 
historical record of institutions, and not only criteria of efficiency cap-
tured by cost-benefit calculations, is what defines whether institutions 
are trustworthy. The EU record in terms of trustworthiness is less stable 
for the East-European publics. They lack consistent cognitive mobilisa-
tion. The economic benefits associated with EU membership are similarly 
less consistent as a result of market reforms, crises, and government 
performance. The EU exists as a single market but it lacks the social net-
works that form the foundation of social trust.       
The second aspect of legitimacy is identity. According to Cerut-
ti, identity is a precondition for legitimacy.45 Only people who perceive 
themselves as being part of the same choices, the same heritage, and 
represented by the same symbols and aspirations, as Cerutti further ar-
gues, would identify with each other (the sense of solidarity that Rostein 
evokes) and with the institutions. Such a dynamic view of identities sug-
gests that they represent a ‘process of self-identification with a polity, not 
an invariable definition’.46
3.1 Political trust 
The EU has failed to maintain its position as a trusted political actor 
in Eastern Europe. At the time of the East-European enlargement, the av-
erage level of trust in the top three political and social institutions in the 
new Member States was on average 13% (ranging from 32% in Estonia to 
42 Kopecky and Mudde (n 29).
43 Scharpf (n 12).
44 Rothstein, Trust, Social Dilemmas, and Collective Memories (n 36) 483; Rothstein, Just 
Institutions Matter (n 36).
45 Furio Cerutti, ‘How Not to (Mis)understand Political Identity in the European Union’ in 
Furio Cerutti (ed), Debating Political Identity and Legitimacy in the European Union (Rout-
ledge) 5.
46 ibid 6.
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6% in Poland).47 The European Union was the most trusted institution only 
in Slovenia (47% of respondents), the second most trusted institution in 
Hungary and Lithuania (54% and 50%, respectively), and the third most 
trusted institution in Slovakia (47%).48 It is obvious that levels of trust 
have varied significantly across the region, but they tend to converge to 
those typical of the West-European EU Member States.49 In contrast to 
the CEECs, however, the EU institutions are generally less trusted by the 
West-European publics than the institutions of national democracy. The 
core of East-European Euroscepticism thus may be defined as the decline 
of trust and loyalty towards the EU, coterminous with low levels of satis-
faction with government performance and national democracy. 
Public opinion in four of the CEECs – Slovenia, Slovakia, Lithuania, 
and Estonia – tends to trust the EU more than the United Nations. How-
ever in four countries, including the large East-European Member States 
– the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland – public opinion has more 
confidence in the United Nations. In May 2012, for the first time since Po-
land joined the EU, the percentage of Poles who tended ‘not to trust’ the 
EU (46%) was higher than the percentage of Poles who tended to ‘trust’ 
it (41%) – a remarkable development for a country that has traditionally 
been pro-European. In 2016, this trend was corrected.
3.2 The declining relevance of the European Union to the publics in 
Eastern Europe
One of the important aspects of East-European Euroscepticism re-
flects the EU’s declining relevance to the citizens of the CEECs. While 
in the early stages of EU membership public trust towards the EU was 
higher than trust in the national government and institutions, pointing to 
expectations that the EU would act as a corrective to the national politi-
cal system, such attitudes have gradually regressed. The current trend 
is one of declining levels of confidence in both the EU and the national 
political institutions. The national government is trusted by 25.5% of 
the East-European citizens, with net negative views of 38.6%.50 The EU 
institutions were more trusted than domestic political institutions. The 
European Commission has been the most trusted EU institution in the 
CEECs (versus the European Parliament in Western Europe), on aver-
age by 41.3% of the East-European public.51 Public attitudes reflected a 
47 According to Eurobarometer data, European Commission (n 38) C 19. 
48 ibid, C 25.
49 ibid, C 20.
50 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 81: Public Opinion in the European Un-
ion (Spring 2014) 63 <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb81/eb81_publ_
en.pdf> accessed 30 December 2016.
51 ibid 89.
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decline in satisfaction with EU democracy and trust towards the EU and 
its institutions. East-European Euroscepticism gradually evolved along 
measures of legitimacy, sense of political effectiveness (‘my voice counts’), 
diverging perceptions of the benefits of EU membership for the Member 
States and for citizens, and uncertainty with regard to the EU’s actual 
impact on the lives of EU citizens. By 2014, trust in the European Par-
liament had declined by nine percentage points to reach a record low of 
39.3% (versus 48.3% trust in 2013).52
Even prior to the 2004 enlargement, East-European public opinion 
was somewhat sceptical of European integration, reflected in uncertainty 
with regard to the importance of diffuse support for the EU’s systemic 
objectives relative to specific support for its policies. This type of Euro-
scepticism may not be distinctly defined either as an outright rejection 
of the EU typical of ‘hard’ Euroscepticism, or as a variety of ‘soft’ Eu-
roscepticism, characterised by disagreement with select EU policies or 
performance. 
The mismatch between the historical value of enlargement and its 
meaning for citizens of the CEECs is the core of East-European Euro-
scepticism. It is reflected in less appreciation of the benefits of EU mem-
bership, less allegiance to the EU institutions, and less convergence in 
public views on the direction of European integration. Furthermore, in 
contrast to the tendency for the EU institutions to maintain higher ap-
proval ratings than national political institutions in Eastern Europe, and 
in particular the national government, the EU appears to have lost its 
reputation as an anchor of stability for East-European countries and as 
a continued source of inspiration for social and economic reform. 
3.3 Eurosceptic images of the EU in the East-European Member 
States: Democratic effectiveness
In the wake of the 2004 accession, the EU has emerged as a distant 
political object for East-European citizens. Gradually, they have come to 
view the EU as less relevant for their living standards. On average, 10% of 
respondents in the eight Central and Eastern European Member States 
consider the EU to have significant effects on their living standards, ver-
sus 51% for the national government and 34% for the regional and local 
level. This is yet another measure of the EU’s remoteness to citizens and 
its limited output legitimacy.53
A related measure of the East-European variety of Euroscepticism is 
the perception of the lack of relevance of the European Union to the con-
52 ibid.
53 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 71 Public Opinion in the European Un-
ion (Eurobarometer September 2009) 81 <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/
eb/eb71/eb71_std_part1.pdf> accessed 30 December 2016. 
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cerns and priorities of the European publics. While 49% of respondents 
in the CEECs agree that unemployment is a national priority, only 21% 
consider it a personal concern. Many of the EU’s important outcomes ad-
dress national, and not personal, priorities, such as the economic situa-
tion, crime, immigration, and terrorism. In contrast, issues such as pen-
sions, healthcare, and rising prices, predominantly perceived as personal 
concerns, are either not directly addressed or are adversely affected by 
EU-level policy making.54
Furthermore, the East-European publics share negative views with 
regard to their political efficacy, reflected in the perception that their 
voice does not ‘count’. As Graph 2 demonstrates, East-European pub-
lic opinion is more sceptical of the effective representation of citizens’ 
concerns in EU affairs than of the representation of the national govern-
ments in the EU institutions. In a majority of the CEECs, public opinion 
is also sceptical with regard to the quality of democratic representation 
of citizens in the domestic political system (statement ‘my voice counts 
in my country’). 
Chart 2. (QA 12) What does the European Union mean to you per-
sonally? Net responses, agreement-disagreement with statement, in per-
cent (2009) 
Data source: European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 71 Public Opinion in the 
European Union (Eurobarometer September 2009) 101 <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opin-
ion/archives/eb/eb71/eb71_std_part1.pdf> 
54 ibid 62.
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The chart shows that negative perceptions of EU as a polity in which 
citizens are represented largely exceed the measures of personal efficacy 
within the national political community. On average, positive opinions 
prevail only with respect to the representation of Member States in the 
EU. The trend of diverging personal and sociotropic assessments has 
persisted. 
Table 1 shows that relative to national democracy in the CEECs, 
perceptions of the trustworthiness and legitimacy of the EU have not im-
proved significantly between 2009 and 2016. 
Table 1. Political trust and legitimacy: comparative data, 2016 v 
2009
QA 12 (2009): What does the European Union mean to you personally? 
D72: Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the 
following statements:
                             My voice counts in            My voice counts
                                  [COUNTRY]                        in the EU
Country 2009 2016 Net Difference 2009 2016
Net 
Difference
Bulgaria 32 45 13 31 38 7
Croatia 68 75 7 22 21 -1
Czech Republic 32 44 12 30 20 -10
Estonia 52 39 -13 28 54 26
Hungary 33 39 6 36 31 -5
Latvia 16 34 18 14 21 7
Lithuania 18 23 5 29 24 -5
Poland 50 62 12 43 47 4
Romania 25 44 19 29 41 12
Slovakia 48 58 10 31 37 6
Slovenia 62 49 -13 41 36 -5
EU-28 51 55 4 38 38 0
CEECs 39.6 46.5 6.9 30.4 33.6 3.3
While on average, positive views of one’s representation within the 
national political community have increased by 6.9% (versus 3.0% for 
the EU-28) positive perceptions of the EU have increased by 3.0% only, 
reversing the prior trend of levels of trust in the EU and its institutions 
exceeding levels for national democracy. Perceptions of trust in the repre-
sentative nature of domestic democracy in the CEECs are moving closer 
to the EU-28 average, closing the gap in democratic legitimacy between 
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the West and the East of Europe. On average, the East-European pub-
lics have maintained lower levels of trust in the EU than the citizens of 
the West-European Member States, positive perceptions have increased 
in both categories, suggesting that a process of building public efficacy 
is taking place, and in that process the national political community is 
emerging as the more trustworthy political arena.       
3.4  Political Behaviour
In 2009, at the height of the European economic and financial crisis, 
a majority of the citizens in the CEECs considered things in the EU to 
be ‘going in the right direction’.55 The highest level of trust in the Euro-
pean Parliament among the 27 EU Member States, 67%, was recorded 
in Slovakia, against an average of 53.5% in Eastern Europe and an EU 
average of 48%.56 At the same time, despite an overall positive EU image, 
East-European citizens did not vote in large numbers in the European 
elections. 
The first elections for Members of the European Parliament in the 
eight CEECs in 2004 ushered in a long-term trend of East-European 
Euroscepticism from the point of view of political behaviour. Disappoint-
ment with the national government was the principal factor for voter par-
ticipation in the elections. The European elections in Central and Eastern 
Europe thus validated the concept of second-order elections, defined by 
a lower turnout than in national-level elections, losses for the principal 
parties in government, and electoral success for newer and smaller par-
ties.57
While public attitudes towards the EU in CEECs were positive in all 
three consecutive elections held in 2004, 2009, and 2014, voter turnout 
in Eastern Europe has been significantly lower than the EU average, as 
well as relative to all new Member States in previous enlargement rounds. 
Such behavioural outcomes reveal yet another aspect of the dynamics of 
democratic legitimacy in the countries of the 2004 EU enlargement. As 
the data in Table 1 demonstrate, voter turnout rates in the European 
elections in Eastern Europe have remained below the EU average in all 
consecutive elections. Electoral results display wide variation both re-
gionally and across time. For example, voter turnout in Lithuania has 
varied between 48.3% in 2004 and 21.0% in the 2009 elections; in Latvia 
– from 53.7% in 2009 to 30.2 in 2014; and in Estonia – from 26.9% in 
55 ibid 63.
56 ibid.
57 Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt, ‘Nine Second-Order National Elections: A Concep-
tual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results’ (1980) 8 European Journal 
of Political Research 3. 
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2004 to 43.9% in 2009. In each election since 2004, voter turnout rates 
in Slovakia have been the lowest in the EU, with an average of 16.5%. 
Table 2. Elections for Members of the European Parliament: Voter 
Turnout Rates in the New Member States (since 1981) 
Country 1981/
1987
1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 Mean 1981-
2014,
By country
Greece* 77.2 80.1 80.4 75.3 62.8 52.6 59.8 69.7
Spain* 68.9 54.7 59.1 64.4 45.9 44.9 43.8 54.5
Portugal* 72.4 51.2 35.5 40.4 38.7 36.8 33.7 44.1
Austria 67.7 49.0 41.8 46.0 45.4 50.0
Finland 57.6 30.1 39.4 40.3 41.0 41.7
Sweden 41.6 38.8 37.8 45.5 51.1 43.0
Czech 
Republic
28.3 28.2 18.2 24.9
Estonia 26.9 43.9 36.5 35.4
Hungary 38.5 36.3 29.0 37.4
Latvia 41.3 53.7 30.2 47.5
Lithuania 48.3 21.0 47.4 34.6
Poland 20.8 24.5 23.8 22.6
Slovakia 16.9 19.6 13.0 16.5 (EU lowest)
Slovenia 28.3 28.3 24.6 28.3
Mean for 
election
59.0 58.4 56.7 49.5 45.5 43.0 42.5
Mean for new 
members
70.5 62.0 55.6 37.3 36.8 33.4** 33.2**
Notes: The results of New Member States in all respective elections are in bold. 
*The electoral result of 77.2% refers to Greece’s accession election in 1981. The mean 
for the 1979 elections was 61.2%.The first European elections in Spain and Portugal were 
held in 1987. The 1989 elections report an average turnout rate for Greece, Spain, and 
Portugal as new members (62.0%). 
The first European elections in Austria, Finland and Sweden as new members were 
held in 1995 (Sweden) and 1996 (Austria and Finland). The 1999 elections report a separate 
average turnout rate for Austria, Finland, and Sweden as new members (37.3%).
** Reported mean for the eight CEECs in 2009, 2014. No results for further new 
members are reported. Bulgaria and Romania (since 2007) and Croatia (since 2013) are 
excluded.
Source: European Parliament, ‘Results of the 2014 Elections’, Turnout by country 
(Table), available at <http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/turnout.html> and author’s 
calculations. 
4 Understanding East-European Euroscepticism
The origins of East-European Euroscepticism are anchored in the 
very nature of the post-communist transition. Even prior to the open-
ing of EU membership negotiations, the transition had developed into a 
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process of contradictory dynamics and high social costs. As Václav Havel 
has noted: 
We are witnesses to a bizarre state of affairs: society has freed it-
self, true, but in some ways it behaves worse than when it was in 
chains. […] there are others, more serious and dangerous symp-
toms: hatred among nationalities, suspicion, racism, even signs 
of fascism; politicking, an unrestrained, unheeding struggle for 
purely particular interests, unadulterated ambition, fanaticism 
of every conceivable kind, new and unprecedented varieties of 
robbery, the rise of different mafias; and a prevailing lack of toler-
ance, understanding, taste, moderation, and reason. There is a 
new attraction to ideologies, too.58 
On the one hand, the principal dimensions of an organised Euro-
pean society in Eastern Europe differ from those in the West, although 
studies of public opinion in the EU, and especially research on Euro-
scepticism, examine the phenomenon through a common lens. Eastern 
Europe is characterised by a less structured public space: lower levels 
of knowledge about Europe, limited domestification of European issues, 
less congruence between voters and parties, and low levels of cognitive 
mobilisation.59 The relative openness of political space in Eastern Eu-
rope to Eurosceptic parties and leaders (both longitudinally and cross-
nationally) has affected the salience of Euroscepticism at the individual 
level through the opportunities for political mobilisation.60 As a result, 
public preferences for European integration have experienced high vola-
tility typical of broader trends in domestic public opinion and electoral 
preferences. 
One of the arguments with regard to the sources of Euroscepticism 
in the CEECs suggests that the East-European accession was not in-
formed by the constraining dissensus typical of EU policy making in the 
post-Maastricht environment. Although levels of support for the EU were 
volatile in the process of the accession negotiations, they did not prohibi-
tively constrain elite action in pursuing EU membership. The emerging 
East-European Euroscepticism at the time did not fully create a pub-
lic atmosphere of ‘constraining dissensus’ that could have restricted 
the scope and freedom of policy choice, or prevented the East-European 
Member States from adopting the policy prescriptions of the community 
acquis in its entirety. 
58 Václav Havel, Summer Meditations (Faber and Faber 1992) 2.
59 Richard Rose and Neil Munro, Elections and Parties in New European Democracies (CQ 
Press 2003).
60 Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, ‘Conclusion: Opposing Europe? Three Patterns of 
Party Competition in Europe’ in Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart (eds), Opposing Europe? 
The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism (OUP 2008).
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At the post-accession stage, however, the ‘constraining dissensus’ 
deepened as a result of increasing public scrutiny of EU policy action at 
the national level. Such performance evaluations were more likely to be 
negative due to the lack of an extensive historical record of EU trustwor-
thiness and weak personal identification with Europe.61
East-European Euroscepticism had emerged as a phenomenon in 
select spheres of public trust and democratic legitimacy, spanning the 
utilitarian-affective and instrumental-ideational dichotomy of public at-
titudes. Against the background of political euphoria and widely shared 
perceptions of systemic benefits, it has persisted due to the bifurcation 
of public attitudes, diverging trends of egotropic and sociotropic, utilitar-
ian and legitimacy assessments, and the growing importance of trust, 
communal solidarity, and social pessimism as a source of public scepti-
cism vis-à-vis European integration. While at the early stages of the East-
European enlargement, the EU was shorthand for freedom of movement, 
peace, and economic growth, recent views of the EU in Eastern Europe 
have become divided and more ambiguous. In parallel with peace and op-
portunities for travel and work, the public image of the EU is associated 
with bureaucracy and waste of money. Peace is no longer a dominant 
image of the EU in Eastern Europe, although it remains a widely shared 
perception of the rationale of the EU among the citizens of the Western-
European Member States.62 
5 Conclusion
There is a tendency to treat Eastern Europe as a more or less coher-
ent EU region based on the common legacies of the post-communist tran-
sition of the CEECs, similar conditions of accession, and a comparable 
extent of membership benefits. Euroscepticism has emerged as an im-
portant shared feature of political support for the European integration 
of the region, validating a common trend in public attitudes throughout 
the ten years since the 2004 accession. 
In reality, while embedded in the same historical context, East-
European citizens have diverse interests, aspirations, identities, and 
expectations of the EU. This paper has presented an argument that 
East-European Euroscepticism is dimensional, spanning issues along 
the utilitarian/affective dichotomy and transcended by aspirations for 
democratic legitimacy. Taking stock of public support for European inte-
61 Hooghe and Marks (n 6).
62 Eurobarometer data, 2004-2014. According to Eurobarometer 81 (Spring 2014), the EU 
was widely associated with the opportunity to travel, study and work everywhere in the EU 
(44%, highest), the Euro (35%), and peace (25%) but also waste of money (25%) and bureau-
cracy (24%). See European Commission (n 50) 79. 
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gration in the first ten years since the 2004 accession from the perspec-
tive of political trust and efficacy measures gives one a better position to 
explain East-European Euroscepticism than conventional utilitarian and 
identity-based measures. 
The findings suggest that the citizens in the CEECs share low levels 
of confidence in the European Parliament, the European Commission, 
and the national governments (in descending order). Regardless of the 
presence of direct elections for the European Parliament, the East-Eu-
ropean publics still trust the United Nations more than the European 
Union and are less likely to vote in the European elections than citizens 
in the West-European Member States.
The lack of trust in the EU institutions reached an historic high in 
2014, while support for continued EU enlargement remained a standing 
preference of East-European public opinion. Such contradictory trends 
suggest that the conventional measures of Euroscepticism as a pan-Eu-
ropean phenomenon need to be re-examined. 
